In this paper, we study the interaction between self insurance and public insurance. In particular, we provide evidence on the relationship between unemployment insurance benefits and home production using the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and the state-level unemployment insurance data of the U.S. The empirical results suggest that moving to a two times more generous state would decrease time spent on home production about 20% for unemployed. Then we pursue a quantitative assessment using a dynamic competitive equilibrium model in which households do home production as well as market production. The model is able to generate the empirical facts regarding unemployment benefits and home production. The fact that unemployment insurance benefits crowd out home production is interpreted as a substitution between the two insurance mechanisms against loss of earnings during unemployment spells.
Introduction
This paper investigates whether households substitute public insurance (unemployment benefits) for self insurance (home production) against loss of earnings during unemployment spells. We do so in three steps. First, we present a static model to develop an intuition regarding the substitutability between different channels of insurance. Second, motivated by the results of the static model, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between the level of unemployment insurance and home production using the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and the state-level unemployment insurance data.
Third, we pursue a quantitative assessment on the documented empirical facts using a dynamic heterogenous-agents model of unemployment with incomplete asset markets.
Although there is a vast literature on the effects of unemployment insurance policies on market production, surprisingly there is lack of theory and evidence on the effects of unemployment benefits on non-market production (in particular, home production).
1
Recent studies provided evidence on the use of home production as a self insurance mechanism against lost/reduced earnings. 2 Since unemployment benefit programs provide another channel of insurance against lost earnings, we would like to investigate whether people tend to substitute these two insurance mechanisms.
In doing so, we initially formulate the problem of unemployed agents in terms of income and time allocations in a single period. They are assumed to enjoy consuming goods and leisure. They are able to produce home consumption goods (home production)
by combining time and market inputs. Their composite consumption is a combination of home produced consumption goods and market produced consumption goods. They receive unemployment benefits, which they allocate to either market produced consump-1 See Krueger and Meyer 2002 for a detailed survey on the labor supply effects of social benefit programs. 2 Aguiar and Hurst 2005 document that households increase home production at retirement. Burda and Hammermesh 2010 and Taskin 2011 document that households increase home production during unemployment spells tion goods or market inputs of home production. They allocate their time to either leisure or home production. Optimality implies that agents tend to spend less time for home production as they receive higher amounts of unemployment benefits, i.e. they substitute self insurance with public insurance.
We then use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and American state-level unemployment insurance data to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between home production and the level of unemployment insurance. The empirical results suggest a negative relationship between the later and the former. In particular, moving to a two times more generous state would -on average -decrease time spent on home production about 20% for unemployed. Moreover, we investigate a stronger relationship between these two insurance channels (unemployment benefits and home production) for those who have less additional insurance opportunities; in particular, single households respond more strongly compared to the entire sample and household that are married with a non-employed spouse respond more strongly compared to those married with an employed spouse.
In order to pursue a quantitative assessment on the substitution between home production and unemployment insurance benefits, we present a dynamic model featuring a heterogeneous agent framework, where households receive idiosyncratic employment shocks. The asset markets are incomplete in which households can partially insure themselves through a non-interest bearing asset. An additional channel of partial insurance is home production, that is households can increase their home production to insure against lost earnings during unemployment spells. The model implies a reduction in average hours of home production in response to the increased levels of unemployment insurance. In particular, the average fraction of time spent on home production for unemployed is decreasing from .17 to .13 as we increase replacement rate from .20 to .90 gradually. This result is consistent with the empirical results and in line with the interpretation of substitutability between self-insurance (home production) and public insurance (unemployment benefits) against loss of earnings during unemployment spells.
Substitutability between insurance channels has been studied in several papers. For instance, Engen and Gruber (2001) consider precautionary savings as a self insurance mechanism and examine the relationship between unemployment insurance and precautionary savings. They find that households increase their precautionary savings in response to a decrease in unemployment insurance benefits. They interpret this as a substitution between self insurance and public insurance. Cullen and Gruber (2000) consider spousal labor supply as a self insurance mechanism against loss of earnings during unemployment spells. They find that unemployment insurance crowds out this kind of family-insurance mechanism. Gruber (1996a,1996b) provide empirical evidence on the fact that households substitute public health insurance for the private one using the policy changes in the U.S. in 1980's and 1990's. Chetty and Saez (2010) emphasize the role of informal self insurance mechanisms such as loans from relatives and spousal labor supply -which does not generate moral hazard problem -in determining the optimal level of social insurance. Among others, Golosov and Tsyvinsky (2007) , Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), Ortigueira and Siassi (2011) , and Taskin (2011) study the interaction between self insurance and public insurance and determine the optimal level of the later under availability of various sources of self insurance. A number of papers including Moffit (1985) , Meyer (1990) , Card and Levine (2000) , and Nakajima (2011) study the effect of unemployment insurance policies on labor supply using the U.S. data.
We contribute to the literature on the interaction between self and public insurance by studying home production and unemployment benefits in a dynamic competitive equilibrium framework, and providing empirical evidence on the interaction between these two insurance mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present a simple theoretical model to illustrate an intuition about the substitutability between different types of insurance channels. We provide empirical evidence in section 3. In section 4, we present the full dynamic model and discuss the quantitative results, and we finally conclude in section 5.
A Static Model
In this section, we propose a simple theoretical model to provide an intuitive explanation for the relationship between unemployment insurance policies and home production. We consider a static model -a modified version of Greenwood et al. (1991) -where individuals maximize their single-period utility by enjoying consumption and leisure. We assume that individuals can consume two type of goods; namely home goods and market goods.
They can spend their income for purchasing market goods or inputs to produce home goods. They can spend their time on leisure or producing goods at home. Therefore, the home good is produced by a combination of individuals' time and market expenditures.
We formulate the problem of the individual as follows:
where, c m is market good, c h is home good, x is amount of income spent on home produc-tion inputs, l is leisure, h is time spent for home production, and b is the unemployment benefits. For simplicity, we assume that the only income for the unemployed individuals is unemployment benefits, b.
Let utility, composite good, and home production function be defined as:
where, e ≤ 1, 0
The individual makes time allocation and expenditure allocation decisions to maximize his/her single-period utility. We obtain the optimality conditions with respect to h and x are as follows:
In above equations, parameter s represents household's willingness to substitute home goods and market goods. Greater s implies a greater substitutability between home and market goods.
We follow optimality conditions 4 and 5 in order to understand the response of h and x with respect to the changes in b. Note that the optimal h and x depend on the substitutability between market goods and home goods (s).
Optimality condition 4 equates the marginal benefit (MB from now on) of h, which is expressed on the left hand side (LHS from now on), to the marginal cost (MC from now on) of h, which is presented on the right hand side (RHS, from now on). MB of an increment in h is reflected as an increase in home goods due to the increase in h multiplied by the utility from each additional unit of home goods. MC of an increment in h is reflected as the foregone utility from decreased leisure due to the increased h.
The effect of a change in b on the optimal level of h depends on two effects: one is a direct effect of a change in b, and the other is an indirect effect through x. They affect the optimal level of h in opposite directions and the dominant one is determined by the value of substitutability between home goods and market goods, s.
The direct effect of an increase in b on the optimal value of h is derived as follows:
according to equation (4), the MB of h is negatively related to the level of b. Therefore, keeping everything else constant, an increase in b implies a downward movement in the optimal level of h. Moreover, the size of the direct effect of increased b on the optimal value of h is bigger for the greater values of s.
The intuition behind the direct effect is the following: when b is increased, the composite consumption is increased and MB from additional consumption units decrease, therefore MB from additional units of home goods decrease as well. 3 Since the MB of h is determined by the utility from increased home goods, the MB of h decreases. As a result, households tend to prefer less h and enjoy more leisure upon an increase in b.
The indirect effect of an increase in b on the optimal value of h is derived as follows: the MB of h is positively related to the level of x. Therefore, the change in the optimal level of x in response to an increase in b affects the optimal value of h as well. Equation (5) determines the optimal level of x, where MB (LHS) is represented by the utility derived from increase in home goods due to the increase in x, and MC To sum up the two opposing effect: the direct (indirect) effect of an increase in b on the optimal value of h is negative (positive) and increasing (decreasing) with s.
Therefore, a threshold levels equates these two effects. If s is greater (smaller) thans, the optimal value of h decreases (increases), otherwise optimal value of h is invariant to an increase in b. Following the empirically plausible values of the elasticity of substitution (1.5 to 2.5) between home and market goods (s), we can conclude that the model implies a negative relationship between the level of unemployment benefits (b) and the time devoted for home production (h).
3 Empirical Evidence
Motivated by the results of the theoretical model in the previous section, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between the level of unemployment insurance and home production in this section.
Data
We The activities that are used for production of goods and services at home instead of purchasing from market are considered as home production. We aggregate the fraction of time devoted to the corresponding activities to measure time spent on home production.
The activities are reported in minutes at daily scale. We rescale them by multiplying with 7/60 to get weekly hours. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for home production in the ATUS.
In ATUS, individuals report their labor force status in five categories: working, absent, unemployed and looking for jobs, temporarily laid off, not in labor force. The first two groups are considered employed, the second two groups are considered unemployed, and the last group is considered inactive agents. Table 1 reports the number of observations in each group.
We use the differences in unemployment insurance policies across states to analyze the effect of the amount of unemployment insurance on the time spent for home production. In general, the states target to make a payment equal to 50% of lost earnings as the unemployment benefits. However, the state policies display variation with respect to their maximum insurance payments, and we exploit this variation to execute our empirical analysis. The unemployment insurance data and the ATUS are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table 5 shows the state dependent maximum weekly unemployment insurance payments and the dispersion across states.
Unemployment Insurance Policies and Home Production
We estimate two alternative equations to test a possible relationship between unemployment insurance policies and home production.
Alternative 1: In this method, we restrict the sample to the unemployed households and estimate the following equation:
where, HP ist is the weekly hours spent on home production of individual i in state s at time t. X i is a set of explanatory variables including age and its square, educational attaintment and its square, family size, race dummies, gender dummy, marital status dummy, and year dummies. Weekly maximum unemployment benefit that individual i can have in state s at time t is denoted with wmb ist .
We We are interested in the estimated coefficient of γ in equation (6) . Panel (a) of Table 2 presents the estimated coefficient of γ for short-term unemployed agents. 7 The corresponding value is -0.22 and statistically significant for this sample (first column). 6 Here, we would like to point out that these durations reflect the long-run averages. The duration of payments usually increase in recessions and decrease to the long-run values upon economic recoveries. 7 Recall that we estimate equation (6) for this sub-group of unemployed in order to proxy those who are eligible for unemployment benefits. The interpretation is that moving to a two times more generous state would -on averagedecrease the time devoted for home production about 22% for an unemployed household.
We also divide the short-term unemployed agents to three sub-groups: single, married with an employed spouse, and married with a non-employed spouse. The second, third and the fourth columns of Table 2 Table 2 reports the results for the entire sample of unemployed (instead of only short-term unemployed). The estimated coefficients are slightly smaller than those for the short-term unemployed. This is a very intuitive result, because one would expect a greater coefficient for those who are more likely to be eligible for unemployment benefits.
Also, the estimated coefficients for the aforementioned sub-groups (single, married w/ an employed, married w/ a non-employed) are ordered similarly with those estimated using short-term unemployed.
Alternative 2: In this alternative, we include the entire set of workers to the sample instead of restricting to the unemployed. In particular, we estimate the following equation:
where, X i represents a set of demographic variables, U i is an unemployment dummy variable, log (wmb st ) × U i is the interaction between benefits and unemployment, and X s is a set of dummy variables for each state. We are interested in the estimated coefficient of γ in equation (7).
We estimate the equation twice; once where U i represents only short-term unemployed (26 weeks or less), and once where it represents the entire set of unemployed. Panels (a) and (b) of Table 3 present the corresponding results. The estimated coefficients are very close to the ones estimated using equation (6) , in which only unemployed were included in estimation. Also, the order of the coefficients estimated for the aforementioned subgroups (all, single, married w/ an employed spouse, married w/ a non-employed) are similar to the order of those estimated using only unemployed.
Interpretation:
We would like to elaborate on interpretation of three interesting empirical results which are robust to both of the alternative estimated equations: i-) the estimated coefficients of γ for single agents are greater than those for the entire sample, ii-) the estimated coefficients of γ for the sub-sample of agents who are married with a non-employed spouse are greater than those for the sub-sample of agents who are married with an employed spouse, iii-) for any given sub-group, the relationship between unemployment benefits and home production is stronger for the short-term unemployed compared to all unemployed.
These three results can be explained intuitively within the context of substitutability between different kind of insurance options. First, a single unemployed individual can maintain his/her consumption through either increasing his/her home production or spending unemployment benefits. Therefore the substitutability between these two channels is supposed to be stronger compared to an individual with more insurance op-tions such as spousal income or spousal home production. Since the substitutability is high between home production and unemployment insurance for a single household, home production decreases strongly when unemployment insurance increases. That is, γ is greater for single households compared to all households. Second, a household with an employed spouse can use the income of the spouse as a self insurance against loss of earnings during unemployment spells. Therefore, one would expect a lower substitutability between unemployment benefits and home production which would imply a smaller γ for those households. Third, one would expect a stronger relationship between the level of unemployment benefits and home production for those who are more likely to be eligible for unemployment benefits. Therefore, the estimated coefficient of γ is greater for the short-term unemployed households. The estimated coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with this interpretation.
Full Model
In this section, we study a realistic dynamic model to quantitatively asses the relationship between unemployment insurance benefits and home production. We do so by extending the model of Hansen andİmrohoroglu (1992) with a home production technology. In general, the model features a heterogeneous agents framework with incomplete asset markets. The details are explained in the following subsections.
Household Preferences and Constraints
The population consists of a continuum of ex-ante identical agents. There is ex-post heterogeneity in the society due to the fact that the agents receive idiosyncratic employmentunemployment shocks. The idiosyncratic shocks follow a two-state Markov process. In particular, the transition probabilities are defined as χ(i, j) = P (e ′ = j|e = i), where i, j ∈ {0, 1}, where e represents the employment status which equals 1 if the individual is employed, and 0 otherwise.
The agents enjoy utility from consumption good and leisure, and maximize their life-time expected utility:
where u(·) is a utility function, β is a time discount factor, c t is consumption, and l t is leisure.
The utility function is a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function composed of consumption and leisure with a risk aversion parameter of σ, and the composition of consumption and leisure is formed as a Cobb-Douglas function with a share parameter of ρ:
Agents have a time constraint which depends on the employment status:
where h t is time spent on home production, l t is leisure and n(e) is labor supply. If an agent is unemployed, then n(e) = 0, if he or she is employed, then n(e) =n, i.e. the labor supply is inelastic and provided in the extensive margin.
The asset markets are incomplete where agents can partially insure themselves through a storage technology (non-interest bearing asset) which evolves as follows:
0 ≤ a t
where x t represents market expenditures, and a t+1 is the amount of wealth carried to the next period. Disposable income (y d t ) depends on employment status and receipt of unemployment benefits which is explained later on. Equation (10) is a borrowing constraint.
Home Production
Agents produce consumption goods through home production which combines time and market expenditures:
where f (·) is a home production function, c t is the amount of consumption goods and services, h t is time spent on home production and x t is market expenditures. In particular, the home production function is a Constant Elasticity of substitution (CES) form as follows:
where, ψ is a home production technology parameter and ν is a parameter which pins down a value for substitutability between time (h) and expenditure (x) inputs of home production, where the elasticity parameter is equal to
Unemployment Insurance, Taxation and Disposable Income
An unemployed agent is qualified for unemployment benefits if he/she does not receive a job offer. If he/she is employed or quits a job by his/her own decision or rejects a job offer, then he/she is not qualified for unemployment benefits. Therefore, only involuntarily unemployed agents receive unemployment benefits. The benefits are provided as a certain faction θ of lost earnings, which is called "replacement rate".
The unemployment benefits are financed through proportional earning taxes, denoted with τ . The unemployment benefit system, proportional taxes and the employment process lead to the following disposable income schedule for the agents:
gets an offer (e = 1), accepts ⇒ y
gets an offer (e = 1), rejects ⇒ y
where, e represents employment opportunity, y d t represents disposable income, y represents wage, and τ represents proportional tax. There is only one type of wage (y) and it is normalized to 1.
The disposable income of an agent equals: (i) unemployment benefits, b, which is payed as a fraction of lost wages θy, if he/she has no job offer; after tax wages, (1 − τ )y, if he/she receives and accepts a job offer; 0, if he/she receives but rejects a job offer.
Recall that the agent can also enjoy his/her accumulated wealth in all these three cases.
Recursive Formulations
In this section, we formulate the problem of agents in recursive form to solve for the equilibrium numerically. An agent with state (a, e) has the following value function formulation:
Equation (16) h is time devoted for home production, f (·) is the home production function, τ is a proportional tax on wages, θ is replacement rate, β is discount factor, and e is employment status.
The first line of equation (16) 
Equilibrium
We define a stationary competitive equilibrium as a set of decision rules of expenditure x(ω), stock of wealth a ′ (ω), home production h(ω), leisure l(ω), offer acceptance η(ω),
where ω = (a, e), a tax rate τ , an invariant measure λ(ω) such that;
• the decision rules solve the agent's problem defined in equation (16),
• the goods market clears:
• the government budget is balanced:
• and the time-invariant distribution solves:
where Ω = {a : a ′ = a ′ (a, e)}.
Among the equilibrium conditions, equation (17) ensures that the market goods produced by employed agents (RHS) equals the total expenditure of market goods (LHS).
Equation (18) equates the taxes collected from employed agents (RHS) to the unemployment benefits payed to the unemployed agents (LHS). Equation (19) ensures that the distribution of the population does not vary over time.
Calibration
The model parameters are calibrated using the U.S. data. We calibrate the values of the parameters such that the chosen model generated moments are consistent with those of the U.S. data. The value of constant labor supply is set to 45% of total available time, which matches average hours of work in the U.S. data. The transition matrix of employmentunemployment states is as follows:
The above transition matrix matches the long-run rate and average duration of unem- Notes: The figure draws the response of optimal time spent for home production to the changes in replacement rates. Greater values of σ indicate higher degrees of risk aversion. ployment in the U.S., which are equal to 6% and 12 weeks, respectively. The benchmark replacement rate (θ) is set to be 40% using the estimated values in the empirical literature.
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The values of technology (ψ) and elasticity of substitution (ρ) parameters are set to .31 and 1.45, respectively. These values are borrowed from Aguiar and Hurst (2007) where they estimate a home production function using American Time Use Survey. The benchmark values of the parameters are reported in Table 4 .
Quantitative Results
In this section, we present the quantitative results from the dynamic model where we analyze the relationship between unemployment insurance and home production. In order to understand the relationship between unemployment benefits and home production, we solve the stationary competitive equilibrium of the model at several replacement rates between 20% and 90%. We compute the average time spent on home production and compare across those stationary equilibria.
In the benchmark model, the average fraction of time spent on home production is decreasing from .17 to .13 as we increase replacement rate from .20 to .90 gradually.
These fractions correspond to 18.70 hours/week and 14.75 hours/week. The fact that time spent on home production is decreasing with replacement rate is robust to various degrees of relative risk aversion (σ), which is depicted in Figure 2 . This result is consistent with the empirical evidence provided in 3. Notes: The figure draws the response of optimal savings to the changes in replacement rates. Greater values of σ indicate higher degrees of risk aversion.
This happens because the direct and indirect effects of unemployment benefits on home production neutralizes each other at this threshold level which was explained in detail using a static model in Section 2.
We report the relationship between the rate of unemployment insurance and mean asset holdings by households in Figure 4 . The level of asset holdings is decreasing with the rate of unemployment insurance. In particular mean assets decrease from 2.5 to 0.5 as we increase the replacement rate from 20% to 90% gradually. This result is in line with the empirical findings of Engen and Gruber (2001) , where they provide evidence on the fact that households substitute self insurance (savings) with public insurance (unemployment benefits). In particular, they report a negative relationship between households' stock of wealth and received unemployment benefits.
In general, the quantitative results can be interpreted within a context of substitutability between self insurance and public insurance. Both savings and home production channels of self insurance are used less intensively in response to an increase in public insurance (unemployment benefits) as shown in Figures 2 and 4 .
Conclusion
Previous literature provided both theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the effects of unemployment insurance policies on market production. However, the effects of unemployment benefits on non-market production (in particular, home production) have not been studied well. This paper fills this gap by studying the relationship between home production and unemployment insurance policies. Both in the model and the data, we find that higher unemployment benefits are associated with lower home production.
This distortion -as well as distortion on market production -should be considered in optimal unemployment insurance policy design.
6 Tables
